New Caledonia: French Government to continue with Bougival process and seek popular referendum in February 2026

On 20 and 26 August, FLNKS, New Caledonia’s pro-independence umbrella group, again rejected the Bougival agreement despite two bilateral meetings with the French Minister for Overseas, Manuel Valls. FLNKS also refused to participate in the “drafting committee,” a body representing all Bougival signatories charged with implementing the agreement through the production of key legislation. The drafting committee’s first meeting took place on 21 August and the constitutional reforms it produced will form the basis for a referendum in New Caledonia on the Bougival agreement no later than 28 February 2026. The reforms will also have to pass through France’s legislative assembly prior to the referendum. In various public statements, FLNKS maintains that it seeks a fresh agreement outlining full sovereignty by 2027, is open to continued negotiation, and has played an active role in de-escalating violence since May 2024. Minister Valls has stated his intention to continue with the Bougival agreement regardless of FLNKS' opposition.

Assessment: Minister Valls will almost certainly continue with the Bougival drafting committee and implementation process, and use the February 2026 referendum to determine its validity amongst the population. Based on recent election results, all groups that remain committed to Bougival account for 70-75% of voters. Bilateral negotiations with FLNKS will also continue, but with the aim to bring them into this process and address their concerns within the constitutional reform (as opposed to a new agreement). FLNKS is likely to pursue one of three courses of action: 1. to re-enter the Bougival process, 2. to protest through online posting and the media, or 3. to conduct physical protests. If pursued, the latter two courses of action are likely to increase in intensity closer to the February 2026 referendum. In the short term, FLNKS will continue negotiations and is highly likely to announce any protest action publicly before it takes place.

Due to this tension, isolated incidents of public violence are also likely in the same areas that have seen violence since May 2024, including Saint-Louis, Païta on the road between Nouméa and La Tontouta airport, and Thio. The incidents are likely to involve roadblocks, stone-throwing, and arson. However, France’s increased security presence is almost certainly sufficient to contain and resolve these incidents as they occur. Preventative measures by security forces, such as traffic control points and liquor bans, are also highly likely.

Sources:  Coralie Cochin, “Manuel Valls en mission en Nouvelle‑Calédonie pour sauver l’accord de Bougival,” La 1ère (Franceinfo), 19 August 2025; Brigitte Whaap and Claude Lindor, “Manuel Valls en Calédonie: les maires insistent sur les difficultés budgétaires,” La 1ère (Franceinfo), 20 August 2025; Marion Thellier, Christian Favennec, and Théo Rouby, “Manuel Valls en Calédonie: la pleine souveraineté avant 2027, le FLNKS réaffirme sa position devant le ministre des Outre‑mer,” La 1ère (Franceinfo), 20 August 2025; Brigitte Whaap, Claude Lindor, and Théo Rouby, “Manuel Valls en Calédonie: le Sénat coutumier présent pour lancer le comité de rédaction de l’accord de Bougival,” La 1ère (Franceinfo), 21 August 2025; Coralie Cochin, “Manuel Valls en Calédonie: le ministre dévoile un calendrier très serré pour concrétiser juridiquement l’accord de Bougival,” La 1ère (Franceinfo), 21 August 2025; Charlotte Mannevy, “Accord Nouvelle‑Calédonie: Manuel Valls rencontre à nouveau le FLNKS,” La 1ère (Franceinfo), 26 August 2025.

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